Citation: (1973) 4 SCC 225
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case came up when His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati, the leader of a religious mutt in Kerala objected to state land reform laws which tried to enforce property ownership limitations. The case was pending when some constitutional amendments were made by Parliament, such as 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments that considerably increased its capability to amend the Constitution and reduced the safeguarding of basic rights. This cast grave doubts on how far Parliament could go in amending the constitution and the possibility of undermining constitutional protections.
Whether the amending power of Parliament under Article 368 is absolute and unlimited or whether it is liable to inherent constitutional restrictions, especially those derived out of the very structure of the Constitution including in the doctrine of separation of powers.
In a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of 13 judges, the Basic Structure Doctrine was propounded, stating that although Parliament has an extensive power to reform the Constitution, they could not alter or destroy the main characteristics of the Constitution. These fundamental characteristics encompass among others supremacy of the Constitution, rule of law, judicial review and separation of powers doctrine.
In implementing this principle, the Court did a thorough review of the nature and extent of the amending power. It rationalized that the unlimited powers that Parliament would have were capable of repealing the basic rights and destroying the institutional structure of governance and therefore it would destroy the very idea of democracy itself. The Court pointed out that the Constitution establishes a balance between the three organs and any amendment that disrupts this balance would be unconstitutional.
The judiciary claimed that it was the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, thus strengthening its independence and blocking legislative usurpation. The Court saw the separation of powers to be an essential component of the fundamental framework, and thus no organ could interfere with the role of the other. This understanding was successful in imposing substantive restrictions on the authority of Parliament and enhanced the checks and balances system.
The Court believed that the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution was not limitless but included a restriction that it could not modify the fundamentals. Separation of powers became a constitutional principle and institutional integrity and democratic governance was maintained.
Citation: 1975 Supp SCC 1
Court: Supreme Court, India.
This case was based on an election controversy whereby the election of the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was called into question based on electoral malpractice. Her election was struck down by allahabad high court and parliament passed the 39 th Constitutional Amendment. The amendment aimed at making the elections of the Prime Minister, President and Vice- President beyond the jurisdiction of the court system effectively protecting them against a legal review.
Whether Parliament may, by a constitutional amendment, preclude the judicial review of election disputes between high constitutional bodies, and thus abridge the judicial power to adjudicate on these issues.
The Supreme Court reiterated that judicial review and doctrine of separation of powers are part and parcel of the fundamental structure of the Constitution. Any effort to bar judicial review or devote judicial powers to the legislature would be against this doctrine.
The Court was critical of the constitutional amendment and concluded that it practically replaced adjudicatory power of the court with Parliament. This was perceived to be a direct infringement of the separation of powers since it gave the legislature the ability to execute judicial roles. The Court pointed out that free and fair elections are one of the key features of democracy, and judicial review is critical to guarantee the integrity of such elections.
The omission of judicial review had tried to put Parliament above the Constitution and thus upset the balance among the arms of government. The judiciary came in to bring this balance back and it claimed that this form of overreach of the legislature cannot be allowed.
The Supreme Court declared the adequate provision of the 39th Amendment as unconstitutional, believing that it infringed the fundamental framework of the Constitution, especially the doctrine of judicial review and separation of powers
Citation: (2007) 2 SCC 1
Court: Supreme court of India.
The case involved the constitutionality of the laws that were deposited on the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and which were historically regarded as being immune to judicial review. Whether this immunity could apply to laws that abuses fundamental rights or even the very fabric was a question raised.
The question whether the laws added to the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda judgment) are to be reviewed by the judiciary in case it interferes with the fundamental rights and the very fabric of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled that any laws, regardless of their location in the Ninth Schedule, are liable to judicial examination in the event that they violate the fundamental framework of the Constitution, such as the separation of powers doctrine.
When applying this rule, the Court stressed that judicial review is a critical role of the judiciary and cannot be overridden by law. Making Parliament exempt to the judiciary would amount to giving it the free hand to exercise its powers thus disrupting the balance of the three arms.
The Court believed that the Ninth Schedule could not serve to avoid constitutional constraints. Any law which impairs the fundamental fabric such as independence of the judiciary and separation of powers would be invalid. This reading solidified the primacy of the Constitution and that of the judiciary as the protector of the Constitution.
The Court affirmed the doctrine of separation of powers by declaring that laws in the Ninth Schedule are not beyond the subject of judicial review and may be overturned to the extent they infringe fundamental rights or the basic structure.
Written by Sristi Kumari,
Legal Intern at Sandhu Law Offices,
DHARMASHASTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY JABALPUR BALLB, FIRST YEAR.