1. Introduction: When a Song Becomes Someone Else’s Property

Music has a strange quality in copyright law. A listener may remember a tune in seconds, while the law may spend pages deciding what exactly has been copied. The difficulty becomes sharper when an original song created by one music producer quietly finds its way into a successful film made by someone else. The film may have a different story, different lyrics, different singers and even a different arrangement, but if a substantial part of the original musical work has travelled into the new production without permission, the question is no longer simply whether the songs sound similar. It is whether a legally protected expression has been taken.

The proposition raises three connected questions. First, who actually owns the copyright in the original song? Secondly, does the defendant’s use amount to infringement when substantial portions have been incorporated into a commercial film? Thirdly, can the defendant rely on a statutory exception, independent creation, public-domain material, a licence, or another recognised defence?

The Copyright Act, 1957 treats a musical work, a sound recording and a cinematograph film as distinct categories of copyrightable subject matter. This separation matters because placing music inside a film does not automatically erase every independent right in the underlying music. Section 13(4) expressly preserves the separate copyright in an underlying work even where it forms part of a film or sound recording.

2. Legal Issues Involved

1. Whether the original song is an original musical work protected under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
2. Whether the music producer is the copyright owner, or whether ownership lies with the composer, lyricist, employer, commissioning producer, assignee or licensee under the relevant contractual arrangement.
3. Whether the defendant’s incorporation of substantial portions of the song amounts to reproduction, adaptation, communication or another restricted act under Section 14 and consequently infringement under Section 51.
4. Whether the defendant can establish a defence based on a licence, assignment, independent creation, public-domain material, idea-versus-expression, or an exception under Section 52.
5. What civil remedies may be available if infringement is established.

3. Applicable Legal Framework

3.1 Copyright in the musical work is distinct from copyright in the film

Section 13(1) recognises copyright in original musical works, cinematograph films and sound recordings. Section 14 then gives the copyright owner exclusive rights over the work or any substantial part of it, including reproduction and, in the case of a musical work, making a cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the work. Most importantly for the present proposition, Section 13(4) states that copyright in a film or sound recording does not affect the separate copyright in the work from which it is made.

That distinction prevents a production house from treating the film as a legal container that automatically swallows the rights in every underlying song. A film has its own copyright, but the musical work incorporated into it may continue to carry a separate copyright interest.

3.2 Ownership: the first question should be ‘whose copyright?’

The proposition calls the claimant a music producer, but the label alone does not settle ownership. The court would have to identify the actual author and then examine how ownership moved, if at all. Under Section 17, the general rule is that the author is the first owner, subject to statutory exceptions, including certain commissioned works. Section 18 permits assignment of copyright, while Section 19 prescribes requirements for a valid assignment. Therefore, contracts, commissioning letters, employment terms, publishing agreements and assignment deeds can become decisive evidence.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association is particularly important because it recognised the coexistence of copyright in a cinematograph film and copyright in underlying musical and literary works, subject to the statutory scheme and the terms governing the work. The Court explained that the producer’s rights in the film do not, merely because music has been incorporated into the film, necessarily destroy the separate copyright in the musical work. (1977) 2 SCC 820.

For the present problem, therefore, the music producer should be able to produce evidence showing creation, authorship and the chain of title. If another person composed the melody, the producer cannot simply rely on having paid for or released the song unless the contractual arrangement actually transferred the relevant rights. Conversely, if the producer commissioned the musical work in circumstances covered by Section 17 or obtained a valid assignment, the defendant’s argument that the claimant is not the owner may become significant.

4. When Does Use Become Infringement?

Section 51 broadly treats copyright as infringed where a person, without a licence from the owner or in contravention of licence conditions, does an act which is the exclusive right of the copyright owner. In the present facts, the defendant has not merely listened to the song or referred to its general style. The proposition says that ‘substantial portions’ were used in a commercially successful film. That fact, if proved, moves the dispute towards the core of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118, remains the starting point for understanding substantial copying. The Court distinguished between an unprotectable idea, theme or subject matter and the protected expression of that idea. It also explained that infringement depends on whether the later work has appropriated the protected expression in a substantial manner.

Applied to music, the practical inquiry should therefore not be reduced to counting seconds. A short passage can be important if it contains the distinctive and protectable core of the composition, while a longer portion may contain only commonplace musical material. The court would look at the character of what has been taken, the degree of similarity, the originality of the copied material, access to the original work and the overall impression created by the allegedly copied expression.

This is also why changing the key, tempo, instrumentation or singer does not automatically answer the infringement question. Cosmetic changes may alter the sound without changing the underlying musical expression that has been appropriated. At the same time, similarity based only on common musical building blocks, genre, mood, rhythm or an idea cannot by itself establish infringement.

5. A Recent Judicial Lens: A.R. Rahman and ‘Veera Raja Veera’

A particularly useful recent development is A.R. Rahman v. Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar & Ors., FAO(OS) (COMM) 86/2025, decided by the Delhi High Court on 24 September 2025. The dispute concerned the song ‘Veera Raja Veera’ from the film Ponniyin Selvan-II and an allegation that substantial and protectable portions of the composition ‘Shiva Stuti’ had been incorporated into the film song. The plaintiff relied on similarities in swar patterns, rhythmic structure and the perceived core of the composition. The defendants, among other things, disputed authorship and ownership and argued that the relevant musical material belonged to a broader traditional corpus.

The case is especially instructive because the Division Bench did not treat the allegation of copying as the first and easiest question. It stressed the foundational importance of establishing subsisting copyright and ownership. The Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the Single Judge’s interim order, while expressly clarifying that the appeal had been considered at the prima facie stage and that the Court was not expressing a final opinion on authorship or originality that could be established through evidence at trial.

The lesson for the present proposition is simple but important: proving that a defendant used a similar musical passage is only one part of the case. The claimant must first stand on a legally sustainable chain of ownership and demonstrate that the allegedly copied material is actually protected expression. The recent decision also shows why evidence of authorship, creation, contracts, recordings and the history of the composition can be as important as a technical comparison of two songs.

6. What Defences Could the Defendant Raise?

Section 52 is particularly relevant because the defendant says that the use is ‘permissible’. The statutory language is important here: the Act does not create a broad American-style ‘fair use’ defence. It specifies particular acts that do not constitute infringement, including fair dealing for purposes such as private use, research, criticism or review, and reporting of current events. The Copyright Office’s current presentation of Section 52 confirms this limited statutory approach.

A commercially successful film using substantial portions of a song for the film’s entertainment value would therefore face a difficult argument if it relies only on fair dealing. The stronger defence, depending on the evidence, may instead be that the claimant does not own the relevant rights, that the copied material is not protected expression, that the defendant independently created the relevant passage, or that a valid licence or assignment existed.

7. Remedies Available to the Copyright Owner

If infringement is established, Section 55 provides civil remedies including injunctions, damages and accounts of profits, subject to the statutory proviso concerning a defendant who proves lack of knowledge in appropriate circumstances. The claimant may therefore seek to stop continued exploitation, seek monetary relief, and require an accounting of profits.

In a film-related dispute, the practical relief may be particularly important because the allegedly infringing work can already be available in theatres, television, music platforms and OTT services. The court may have to balance the need to protect copyright with the consequences of disrupting a completed commercial production. That does not eliminate the underlying right; it affects the form and timing of relief.

8. Reasoned Legal Opinion

On the facts given, the defendant cannot successfully defend the use merely by saying that the song was placed inside a film or that the film itself is independently copyrighted. The Copyright Act recognises separate rights in underlying musical works, and Section 13(4) prevents the film copyright from automatically extinguishing those rights. The stronger legal question is whether the claimant can prove a valid copyright interest in the particular musical expression that was allegedly taken.

If the music producer can establish authorship or a valid chain of title, and the comparison shows that the defendant has reproduced a substantial and protectable part of the song without permission, Section 14 read with Section 51 would provide a strong statutory basis for an infringement claim. The commercial success of the film is not itself the legal test, but it may become relevant to the scale of exploitation and the remedies sought.

At the same time, the defendant is entitled to challenge the foundation of the claim. The recent A.R. Rahman decision is a useful reminder that courts will not treat performance, similarity or access as substitutes for proof of authorship and ownership. The defendant may also argue that the alleged similarity comes from unprotectable ideas, conventional musical elements, public-domain material or independent creation. Whether any of these arguments succeeds would depend on evidence rather than the label attached to the defence.

In my view, the most legally sound way to approach the dispute is therefore to treat it as a chain: ownership → subsistence of copyright → protected expression → substantial taking → absence of permission → availability of a statutory or contractual defence → appropriate remedy. Breaking the chain at any stage can materially change the outcome. This approach is also fair to both sides because copyright should protect genuine creative expression without turning ordinary musical vocabulary into private property.

9. Conclusion

The dispute described in the proposition is ultimately about more than two songs sounding alike. It is about identifying whose creative labour the law protects, what exactly has been copied, and whether the defendant had a legal right to use it. Indian copyright law deliberately allows a film and its underlying music to coexist as separate copyright interests. The existence of a film copyright is therefore not, by itself, a complete answer to a claim concerning an underlying musical work.

For the claimant, the safest case is one supported by a clear chain of title, evidence of original creation and a focused comparison showing substantial appropriation of protected expression. For the defendant, the meaningful defences lie in challenging ownership, originality, copying or authorisation, or in bringing the use within a specific statutory exception. A court deciding such a dispute would consequently have to look beyond the popularity of the film and beyond the surface similarity of the songs, and examine the legal identity of the work itself.

The broader point is worth remembering: copyright does not protect every sound that feels familiar, but neither does a new arrangement become original merely because it is dressed in new production. The law sits between those two extremes, protecting identifiable creative expression while leaving common ideas and musical language available for everyone.

References and Authorities

1. The Copyright Act, 1957, especially Sections 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 51, 52, 55 and 57.
2. Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association, (1977) 2 SCC 820.
3. R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118.
4. A.R. Rahman v. Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar & Ors., FAO(OS) (COMM) 86/2025, Delhi High Court, judgment dated 24 September 2025, 2025:DHC:8522-DB.
5. Copyright Office, Government of India, ‘Exceptions to Infringement Under Copyright Act, 1957’ (updated 16 July 2026).
6. Copyright Office, Government of India, Chapter III of the Copyright Act, 1957.
7. Copyright Office, Government of India, Chapter XII of the Copyright Act, 1957.