According to the Hindu Marriage Act, 19551 a marriage is said to be completed and binding when the saptapadi happens (bride and bridegroom taking seven rounds together around the fire) and bridegroom and the bride should be 21 and 18 years of age respectively. The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights helps the aggrieved spouse to see judicial remedies which directs the other spouse to resume cohabitation when he/she has withdrawn from the others company without any reasonable excuse. Through this, the aggrieved spouse can file a petition in the court seeking restitution of conjugal rights.
If the court is satisfied that:
The court may pass a decree saying the couple may start living together.
The court may refuse the husbands petition if the wife proves:
Restitution of conjugal rights is given in Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The importance2 and relevance of this section lie in its ability to provide a legal solution to the aggrieved spouse who is facing abandonment by the other spouse without a reasonable excuse. This provision is crucial for preserving the sanctity of marriage and encourages reconciliation between the couple and serves as a safeguard against unjustified separation.
In 3T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah, the issue was whether Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which provides for restitution of conjugal rights, violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The court held that, that compelling a spouse to cohabit with the other spouse amounts to an invasion of:
The Court further held that the provision disproportionately affected women and therefore offended the guarantee of equality under Article 14.
This means whether the husband can legally file and continue such a case
Need to examine:
I. The marriage would only be valid if the bride and the bridegroom according to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 per formed the saptapadi or not and if they are of reasonable age, which is 18 and 21 respectfully.
II. If it is proven that the wife has left the marital home
III. The petition may be dismissed if the wife has a reasonable excuse for leaving like domestic violence, dowry related violence, adultery.
This asks whether Section 9 of the HMA is consistent with the constitution?
To discuss:
1. The Restitution of Conjugal Rights 4 (RCR) has been a topic of debate in which the constitution and equality are at stake. Critics have argued that RCR is a fundamental violation of women’s right to equality. They contend that RCR’s nature is antithetical to privacy and is a threat to people’s dignity and autonomy. But supporters of RCR have said that it is the legitimate state purpose to maintain marriage and to promote reconciliation. They say RCR applies equally to spouses and courts to judicially decide the terms of a decree, as well as the legal system at large and the parties involved in the case. RCR is an issue that is far from settled as constitutional, with strong arguments for and against the validity of the provision of RCR. RCR presently remains part of Indian family law and the courts are free to make such decrees based on the context of each case. Will some legal developments lead to a re-evaluation of the constitutional validity of RCR and its application in Indian family law in the future
2. Critics say Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act indirectly restricts some freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1) particularly:
I. Freedom of movement [Article 19(1)(d)] by pressuring a spouse to return to the matrimonial home.
II. Freedom of residence [Article 19(1)(e)] by limiting a person’s choice to live separately from their partner.
III. Freedom of expression and personal autonomy [Article 19(1)(a)] because marital choices are part of someone’s own self-expression and decision making.
3. Critics argue that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights compels a spouse to resume cohabitation against their will. This may be as follows:
Order XXI Rule 32
Provides the mode of execution of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Such decrees cannot be enforced through physical compulsion; the court may attach the property of the defaulting spouse.
The husband sought restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act after the wife left the matrimonial home. The constitutional validity of Section 9 was challenged.
Whether Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 9 and overruled the contrary view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah. The Court held that the provision aims to preserve marriage and encourage reconciliation between spouses rather than compel sexual relations.
A Public Interest Litigation filed by law students challenges the constitutional validity of:
The petition argues that restitution of conjugal rights violates:
The challenge relies heavily on the privacy jurisprudence developed in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India6, where the Supreme Court recognized privacy, dignity, and autonomy as fundamental rights. The petition contends that compelling a spouse to cohabit through a judicial decree is inconsistent with these constitutional values.
As of 2026, the matter remains pending before the Supreme Court. Therefore, Saroj Rani continues to be the binding precedent, but the constitutional validity of restitution of conjugal rights is under active reconsideration
In my view, a husband’s petition for conjugal rights after his wife leaves the matrimonial home under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is valid so long as that withdrawal was not without a reasonable reason. And by the Supreme Court ruling in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha7, it is constitutional and binding law.
However, the constitutional landscape has changed a lot since Saroj Rani. The recognition of privacy, dignity, bodily autonomy and decisional freedom as fundamental rights under Article 21 in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India is an important matter for the compatibility of restitution of conjugal rights with modern constitutional values. A decree directing a spouse to resume cohabitation may indirectly force an individual to stay in a relationship against their wishes, undermining their autonomy.
At the same time, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights cannot be enforced through physical compulsion. It is reconciliation rather than coercion. So the provision is not totally unconstitutional only because it seeks to preserve marriage.
On balance, Section 9 is still legally enforceable based on Saroj Rani, but there is a case for judicial reconsideration as privacy jurisprudence develops. The law should be written in a manner that values individual dignity and free choice and that facilitates voluntary reconciliation of spouses. Any further review of Section 9 should be in the best interests of marriage and the constitutional rights of privacy, autonomy and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.
The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 allows an aggrieved spouse to seek a judicial decree when the other spouse withdraws from cohabitation without reasonable cause. In the present case, the husband’s petition is maintainable if he can establish that the wife’s withdrawal was unjustified and that no legal ground exists for denying relief.
Judicially, the constitutional validity of Section 9 has been a subject of debate. While the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah held the provision unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha upheld its validity, emphasizing its role in preserving the institution of marriage and promoting reconciliation. Consequently, Saroj Rani remains the binding precedent.
However, the development of privacy and autonomy jurisprudence, particularly through K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, has renewed constitutional concerns regarding the impact of restitution of conjugal rights on individual dignity, privacy, and bodily autonomy under Article 21. The pending challenge in Ojaswa Pathak v. Union of India reflects the continuing debate over whether the provision aligns with contemporary constitutional values.
Therefore, while restitution of conjugal rights remains a valid legal remedy in India, its constitutional legitimacy continues to be questioned. The issue represents an ongoing tension between the protection of marriage as a social institution and the safeguarding of individual rights and personal autonomy in a constitutional democracy.
Written by Divumna Bhat
Legal Intern, Sandhu Law Offices
B.A. LL.B., 2nd Year, Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law