The unstoppable emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as an expressive content producer has triggered a paradigm shift in jurisprudence with regard to the very principles of the copyright law. The idea of authorship is at the centre of this dispute. This article is a critical analysis of the question of whether autonomous AI systems can be considered the authors or owners of copyright under the statutory law of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957. In dissecting the anthropocentric definitions of the Act and examining the judicial environment in which the issue is evolving, this paper suggests that the human-based legal framework of skill and judgment cannot support machine authorship unless the law is radically changed. The discussion also discusses case studies, the policy implications of the non-human entity getting copyright and the conclusion made is offered based on the suggestions on how to manoeuvre the AI-authorship dilemma based on the intention of the legislature and practicality in its application.

INTRODUCTION

This is a technological renaissance in which the line between the human creativity and algorithmic output is being rapidly blurred. Models such as Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPT) and advanced diffusion models are no longer just a tool to express yourself as a human being; they have become creative forces and can generate novels, write complex software, and compose symphonies. This change of computer-assisted production into computer-generated output has cast the hospitality of the present intellectual property (IP) regimes into a new perspective.

It is the conflict with the statutory language of the Copyright Act, 1957 (the “Act”). Although the Act aims to encourage and safeguard expression, it does it by means of definitions based on human agency. Since AI produces works with little or no human input, a vacuum is formed: Who is the author? This article will attempt to manoeuvre through this legal and philosophical dead end by arguing that the identification of AI as a copyright owner on the current Indian legal system is both statutory unsustainable and theoretically unsound.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Human-Centric Lens of the Copyright Act, 1957
Traditionally, copyright protection was viewed as a stimulus to make human creators invest time and intellectual effort in the public domain. This anthropocentric philosophy is enshrined in the major provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Section 2(d) of the Act begins the list of rigid definitions of who is to be regarded as an author.
In the case of dynamic works, it states:

“(i) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, the person who creates the work;

(vi) in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated,
the person who causes the work to be created;”

More importantly, the statutory language makes frequent use of the word person. Although the definition of person is not contained in the Copyright Act itself, section 3(42) of General Clause Act,1897 defines person as any company, association or a body of individuals. This definition means a legal person, either natural or juristic. The crucial aspect of an AI algorithm is the absence of the fundamental feature of personhood, which does not meet the textual criteria of a person, who can be an author.

Section 2(d)(vi): The Misleading Proviso?

The amendments of 1994 added a new definition under Section 2(d)(vi) which states that the authorship of the computer-generated works should be ascribed to the…person who causes the work to be generated. This was written at a time when computers were still passive as opposed to being creators. The legal vagueness is greater with autonomous AI. Who caused the creation when the user makes one prompt and the AI pumps out the entire work? A user offering a minimal prompt will hardly put sufficient skill, labor and judgment into the output to qualify as the creator under current statutory interpretation.

RELATED CASE STUDIES

Although Indian courts have not yet taken a direct decision on the authorship of AI, parallel trends in international and national jurisprudence provide crucial contextual indicators.

International Jurisprudence
The prevailing international law view is a strong pillar of the human-creativity requirement. The Monkey Selfie Case (Naruto v. Slater): The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. confirmed that no copyright could be registered to a non-human, in this case the Court stated that the Copyright Act refers exclusively to persons.

The Stephen Thaler/DABUS Litigations: Dr. Stephen Thaler has tried several times to register the AI (DABUS) as an author but this has been denied worldwide. It has always been decided in courts that the copyright law is based on the human authorship.

The Indirect Indian Approach
In India, judicial authorship standards are stringent and are focused on human personality. The Supreme Court of India in the landmark case of Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak (2008) embraced the doctrine of skill, labor and judgment. The Court stressed out that copyright protection should be awarded to the outcome of applying the skill and judgment of a human. Under common law interpretation, machine authorship is impossible under this principle. An artificial intelligence system does not work based on a subjective judgment but rather statistical probabilities.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The impossibility of an AI system receiving a copyright is not only a legal impossibility but also a policy issue that threatens to uproot the intellectual property theory.

1. The Incentivization Dilemma

The IP law is based on the utilitarian theory. It is aimed to provide a certain monopoly to encourage creators to invest in the future production. AI is not responsive to, and does not need such economic incentives. Copyrighting AI would not achieve this basic objective, which would only further profit the providers of the infrastructure.

2. The Moral Rights Conflict

The Act of 1957 under section 57 of the Act vehemently defends the moral rights of an author, such as the right of paternity and the right of integrity. These rights are highly individual and they outlive even the transfer of economic rights. An artificial intelligence system does not experience reputational losses, is not indignant, and does not require recognition.

3. Over-Protection and the Public Domain

AI systems can generate unlimited content at a minimal marginal cost. Assuming that machines are capable of copyright would immediately flood the world with proprietary creations of inhuman speed. This would drastically limit the popular sphere.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Autonomous algorithmic creativity was not considered by the authors of Copyright Act, 1957. Starting with the reiterative textual explanation of an author as a person, to the overwhelming anthropocentrism of skill, labor, and judgment, Indian law gives machines no basis on which to claim copyright.

The Indian government should take the initiative to seek creative statutory structures in order to solve this crisis:

1. Amendment of Section 2(d)(vi): This is that the Act needs to define computer-generated differently by spelling out computer-assisted and computer-generated.

2. Introduction of a Sui Generis Right: A brand-new category of rights might be created with respect to the entity which publishes AI-generated content, and it may have a much shorter period (10-25 years) than the entire lifetime plus 60-year period.

3. Mandatory AI Training Licensing: The government should deal with the problem of the input. There should be a system of mandatory licensing and mandatory royalty, so that human creators whose works are utilized to train AI are adequately paid.