The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 transformed and revolutionized India’s approach to corporate insolvency by introducing a unified and time- bound resolution framework.
Although, after its implementation it achieved initial success, but, over time, the Code has faced persistent challenges, including delays in resolution, judicial backlog, declining recovery rates, and concerns regarding value erosion.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 seeks to address these issues through structural reforms. These reforms include such as accelerated admission processes, creditor driven mechanisms, enhanced powers of the Committee of Creditors and the introduction of cross border insolvency provisions.
This article provides a critical analysis of these reforms and also analyses the 2026 amendment by examining its objectives, key provisions, and potential impact on insolvency ecosystem. While the amendment enhances efficiency and reinforces creditor confidence, it also raises
concerns about excessive creditor dominance, reduced judicial oversight and implementation challenges.
This article also provides the evolution of insolvency law in India in brief and also argues that although the 2026 amendment represents a progressive step in evolution of India’s insolvency regime, its success will depend on effective institutional support, regulatory clarity, and
judiciary discipline.
INTRODUCTION
Insolvency law plays a foundational role in shaping the economic health of a country. It determines how efficiently a system can deal with business failure, redistribute resources, and restore economic stability. The enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC)1
1 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Act 31 of 2016).
marked a turning point in India’s corporate insolvency framework. Prior to its introduction, insolvency resolution was governed by a fragmented regime comprising statutes such as the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 and the Companies Act, 1956, which were widely
criticized for inefficiency and delay.2 3
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was designed to fundamentally rebalance the relationship between debtors and creditors in India. By shifting to a creditor-in-control model and introducing strict timelines for insolvency resolution, it aimed to correct the inefficiencies
of earlier frameworks that were plagued by delays and poor recovery rates. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 emerges against this backdrop.4 It represents an attempt by the legislature to recalibrate the insolvency framework and address persistent inefficiencies.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the IBC, India’s insolvency framework was governed by multiple statutes, including the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 (SICA), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 19935 and the Companies Act, 1956. These laws were characterized by inefficiency and delay, often resulting in value erosion rather than recovery. Recognizing these shortcomings, the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC) recommended the creation of a unified insolvency framework.6 This led to the enactment of the IBC in 2016, which introduced a creditor-driven model and emphasized time-bound resolution.
The early years of the IBC witnessed notable successes. High-profile cases demonstrated improved recovery rates and faster resolution compared to the earlier regime. However, as the number of cases increased, systemic challenges began to emerge. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) faced a growing backlog, and the statutory timelines prescribed under the Code were frequently breached.7
Judicial interpretation played a crucial role in shaping the contours of the IBC. In Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of timely
2 Sick Industrial Companies Act,1985 (Act 1 of 1986).
3 Companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956).
4 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 (Act 6 of 2026).
5 The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Act 51 of 1993).
6 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Statement of Objects and Reasons; Bankruptcy Law Reforms
Committee, The Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee vol. I, at 17–25 (Ministry of Finance, 2015).
7 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, Report on Implementation of IBC (2023).
resolution and limited judicial intervention.8 Similarly, in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of
India, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Code and reaffirmed the primacy of
the Committee of Creditors.9
RELATED CASE STUDIES
Judicial decisions have been central to the evolution of insolvency law in India. Several landmark cases illustrate both the strengths and limitations of the IBC framework. One of the earliest and most significant cases, Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, established the
principle that once default is proven, the adjudicating authority must admit the insolvency application without delving into extraneous issues.10 This decision reinforced the objective of speed and certainty. In Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld
the differential treatment of financial and operational creditors and emphasized the central role of the Committee of Creditors in the resolution process.11
Another important development came in Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, where the Court clarified the scope of judicial review over decisions of the Committee of Creditors.15 It held that commercial decisions of the CoC should not be interfered with unless they violate statutory provisions.12 The case of Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India expanded the scope of insolvency proceedings by bringing personal guarantors within the ambit of the IBC.13
While these cases contributed to doctrinal clarity, they also exposed systemic issues. The 2026 amendment attempts to address these issues by streamlining procedures and reducing reliance on judicial intervention.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 introduces several important
reforms. While these changes aim to enhance efficiency and strengthen the insolvency
framework, they also raise significant concerns.
8 Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407.
9 Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17.
10 Supra note 8.
11 Supra note 9.
12 Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531.
13 Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India, (2021) 9 SCC 321.
One of the most notable features of the amendment is the emphasis on expedited admission of insolvency applications. By reducing procedural delays at the initial stage, the amendment seeks to ensure that cases enter the resolution process more quickly.14
Another significant reform is the introduction of creditor-driven initiation mechanisms. Allowing creditors to initiate insolvency proceedings with reduced reliance on tribunals may ease the burden on adjudicating authorities and promote efficiency. However, this shift also
raises concerns about excessive concentration of power in the hands of financial creditors. There is a risk that such mechanisms may be used strategically, potentially disadvantaging debtors and smaller stakeholders.15 The strengthening of the Committee of Creditors further
reinforces the creditor-centric nature of the IBC. While this aligns with the objective of ensuring financial discipline, it also limits the role of other stakeholders in the resolution process. Operational creditors, in particular, may find their interests inadequately represented.16
The introduction of cross-border insolvency provisions is a progressive step that aligns India with international standards. In an increasingly globalized economy, such provisions are essential for dealing with multinational insolvencies. However, their effectiveness will depend
on the development of reciprocal arrangements and cooperation between jurisdictions.17
Despite these positive developments, significant challenges remain. Institutional capacity continues to be a major constraint. The reduction of judicial oversight, while intended to streamline processes, may lead to concerns regarding fairness and transparency. Another
concern relates to implementation.18 The success of the amendment will depend on effective coordination between regulators, adjudicating authorities, and market participants. Without adequate infrastructure and training, even well-designed reforms may fail to achieve their intended objectives.
Thus, while the 2026 amendment represents a significant step forward, it must be viewed as part of an ongoing process of reform rather than a definitive solution.
14 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, Annual Report 2022–23
15 Reuters, India Proposes Creditor-Led Insolvency Reforms, Mar. 2026.
16Supra note 9; IBC § 21.
17 UNCITRAL, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997); Insolvency Law Committee, Cross Border
Insolvency Report (2018).
18 Upendra Baxi, The Crisis of the Indian Legal System (1982); M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th ed.
2018).
CONCLUSION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 represents a significant effort to strengthen India’s insolvency framework. By addressing delays and enhancing creditor rights, it seeks to improve efficiency and restore confidence in the system. However, the
effectiveness of these reforms will ultimately depend on their implementation. Legislative changes must be complemented by institutional strengthening, capacity building, and regulatory clarity.
First, there is a need to significantly enhance the capacity of adjudicating authorities. First, there is a need to significantly enhance the capacity of adjudicating authorities. Third, the cross- border insolvency framework should be supported by international cooperation agreements to ensure effective enforcement. Finally, continuous monitoring and evaluation of the insolvency framework are necessary. Law reform must be dynamic, responding to emerging challenges and evolving economic realities. While it addresses several existing shortcomings, its success will depend on a careful balance between efficiency and fairness, as well as sustained institutional support.
Written by Ankit Kumar,
Legal Intern at Sandhu Law Offices,
ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI BALLB, 2ND YEAR.
Bhavya Rai
The article does well to flag the central tension the 2026 amendment creates: efficiency vs. fairness. Accelerated admission, creditor-driven initiation, and stronger CoC powers all push in one direction that is speed. But speed without adequate judicial oversight has historically been where the IBC’s real casualties have been felt, particularly by operational creditors, employees, and resolution applicants who have no seat at the CoC table.
The cross-border insolvency provisions are the most forward-looking part of the amendment, but as the article correctly notes, they are only as good as the reciprocal arrangements India manages to negotiate, and that is still a work in progress.
One gap I noticed in the article: it does not engage with the Supreme Court’s 2025–26 judgments (Piramal Capital, Torrent Power) which had already pushed CoC accountability to its limits even before the 2026 amendment. Those cases are the judicial backdrop against which the amendment’s creditor-strengthening provisions need to be read critically.
Good foundational read for anyone tracking IBC reform.
Sandhu Law Offices
Thank you for the thoughtful insights. You raise an important point regarding the impact of recent Supreme Court judgments like Piramal Capital and Torrent Power on CoC accountability. We agree that these decisions form a crucial backdrop for understanding the 2026 amendments and their implications. The balance between efficiency and fairness remains at the heart of the insolvency framework, and your observations add valuable depth to the discussion.